Season of elections is round the corner in India, and political leaders are questioning the authenticity of electronic voting machines. This has been a recurring concern ever since the adoption of the technology. Now, lets try to demystify this complex machine which plays a significant role in a democratic world
In September, the Supreme Court declined to consider a request for an audit of the source code of the Election Commission’s electronic voting machines (EVMs). The court stated that there was no evidence to suggest the Election Commission was not fulfilling its mandate. However, concerns persist about whether the ECI is truly following its mandate, particularly in terms of the security of the electronic voting process.
To unravel the complexities of this security dilemma, The Wire has spent the past month analysing various publicly available documents and sources related to the election process and EVMs. What we found is that the entire election machinery, from EVM manufacturing to software development and auditing, is controlled by the Union government. The Election Commission has limited influence over these processes.
The source code of the EVMs, which serves as the brain of the machine, has never been audited or disclosed by the ECI, manufacturers, or the Technical Evaluation Committees (TECs) appointed by the government. The TECs rely on information provided by engineers from the manufacturing companies, Bharat Electronics Limited and Electronics Corporation of India Limited, both of which are not under the control of the ECI.
The source code, a set of instructions in human-readable language, dictates how the machine functions. The petitioner’s concern before the Supreme Court was that altering the source code could impact election outcomes. However, the source code has never been shared with the TECs, and the ECI doesn’t even have access to the software loaded onto the EVMs; that right lies solely with the manufacturers.
Contrary to practices in other countries, India maintains a high level of secrecy around its EVMs, raising significant questions about the security of the election process. Countries like Australia and Venezuela have more transparent processes, with open-source software and source code audits. In India, the lack of transparency has raised concerns about the potential for insider manipulation and overall electoral security.
Efforts to access the source code through RTI requests have been met with resistance, with the ECI citing “intellectual property rights.” Former Chief Election Commissioner, Ashok Lavasa, emphasised the need for a foolproof system and suggested that the ECI should prioritise transparency to build public trust, especially in terms of the security of the electronic voting system.
While India’s EVMs have faced scrutiny, the government’s default mode has been opacity, particularly concerning the security measures in place. The lack of clarity surrounding the source code and the ECI’s opaque responses to RTIs have fuelled skepticism about the overall security of the electronic voting process. In conclusion, understanding the security dynamics of India’s EVMs reveals a system marked by secrecy, limited transparency, and significant questions regarding the security of the election process. Efforts to ensure credibility, dialogue, and transparency, particularly on the security front, remain crucial for building public trust in the voting system.
